Vanderbilt University Law School

Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2010

Citizens United & Corporate & Human Crime
Christopher Slobogin

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Christopher Slobogin, Citizens United & Corporate & Human Crime, 14 Green Bag 2d. 77 (2010)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/239

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact
mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

CITIZENS UNITED &
CORPORATE & HUMAN CRIME

I

Christopher Slobogin†

UNITED V. ELECTION COMMISSION,1 the Supreme Court
held that corporations have the same First Amendment rights
as human beings. As one commentator put it, for First
Amendment purposes “corporations are now ‘people.’”2 Thus,
like human citizens, corporations can exercise their right to free
speech by spending as much money as they like trying to influence
elections.
I’m not going to attack or defend Citizens United. Rather, I explore below, briefly and somewhat fancifully, Citizens United’s implications for criminal liability, corporate and otherwise. Citizens
United could influence the fate of corporations suspected of wrongdoing in four ways, three of them doctrinal and one practical. First,
it reinforces the long-accepted but still highly controversial proposition that, despite their inanimate nature, corporations can be criminally prosecuted for harm they cause. At the same time, Citizens
United provides fodder for those who would soften current corporate liability and punishment rules. Third, the decision could bolster
the case for expanding corporate criminal procedure rights. Finally,
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whatever the merit of these doctrinal predictions, as a practical
matter Citizens United will help ensure that corporations are rarely
punished to the limits of the law.
Citizens United might also have a significant impact on how the
criminal justice system treats street criminals, at least if the doctrinal developments just alluded to come to pass. After all, the
courts can hardly withhold from human offenders and suspects the
dispositional breaks and procedural rights they have granted nonhuman corporations. Right?

T

CRIMINAL LIABILITY

he litigation that led to Citizens United is the latest sally in a century-long debate over whether corporations should be considered purely artificial entities or instead treated as natural persons
guaranteed the same constitutional rights that individuals enjoy.
Over that period, corporations have managed to acquire due process rights, equal protection rights, and a number of other entitlements.3 Outside of a few lost skirmishes over the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments (discussed further below), the natural rights folks
have pretty much triumphed. Citizens United is just another notch in
their battle axes.
But Citizens United does have a downside for corporations. Although corporations have for some time been subject to criminal
liability on the ground that they are legal persons, the argument has
persisted that only the officers and employees responsible for the
crime, not the corporate entity itself, should be prosecuted. Some
have contended, for instance, that just as the legal personhood of
young children does not require that they be held criminally accountable, the fact that corporations are persons for most constitutional purposes is irrelevant to whether they can be charged with
crime.4 But that argument makes less sense after Citizens United.
3
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Corporations, the Supreme Court said in that case, must be allowed
to participate in the “marketplace of ideas.”5 Whatever might be the
case for infants, an entity that has political will also has free will.
Once it is established that a corporation can be an autonomous
actor, it follows that the criminal penalty for corporate wrongdoing
should be proportionately harsher as the mens rea – perhaps aggregated over multiple actors within the corporation – progresses from
negligence through reckless toleration to premeditation. And while
a corporation cannot be put in prison, if a corporation is a person it
can be required to do penance in ways other than paying a fine. Indeed, restorative justice processes and shaming penalties might be
even more meaningful in this setting, because they are likely to receive national attention when large companies are involved. Corporations could be required to suffer sanctions victims impose, and
public castigation of malfeasant businesses could occur on TV and
radio. Just think what judges could do to BP in this type of regime
(for starters, require that its green flower logo drip with oil).
So Citizens United could be the final blow against those who resist
criminal liability for corporations. But it could also have a mitigating effect when the government seeks to prosecute, in two ways.
First, strict liability and liability for simple negligence, currently
staples of corporate criminal doctrine,6 are usually anathema when a
person is being punished, at least when the punishment involves
something other than a small fine.7 Second, as the Supreme Court
suggested in its recent case striking down life-without-parole for
juveniles, all criminals, except those who commit murder or are
too old, are entitled to show they can be rehabilitated.8 In the corporate context deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements are already popular, because they reduce corporate recidi5
6

7
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vism and minimize damage to the wealth and jobs the corporation
represents.9 Now corporate bodies can make even stronger pleas for
such “treatment.”
So much for doctrine. The practical consequences of Citizens
United for corporate criminal liability are less subtle. Given the additional political power corporations and chambers of commerce
now have,10 the probability increases substantially that the relatively
lenient criminal liability and dispositional rules just described will
find favor. Without contemplating any type of corruption, it can be
assumed that, after Citizens United, public officials who do not like
strict liability crimes and harsh sentences in the corporate context
are more likely to be elected.

A

FAIRNESS OBJECTIONS

common objection to corporate criminal liability, even a soft
version of it, is that it unfairly penalizes shareholders and employees who had nothing to do with the criminal action. One could
argue that this objection has particular purchase when the case for
corporate criminal liability is based on Citizens United. After all,
corporate speech is presumably designed to further the goals of all
of those who have an interest in the corporation and thus likely to
be supported by owners and workers alike. In contrast, corporate
crime is almost always committed by only a few actors; virtually
everyone else connected with the company can be assumed to condemn their malevolent deeds. So, it can be argued, a case about
whether collectives have free speech rights has nothing to say about
whether collectives can commit criminal actions.
Let us assume that the shareholders and most employees of a
wrongdoing corporation are not complicit in any way with the
9

See Peter Henning, Corporate Liability and the Potential for Rehabilitation, 46
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of Commerce planned to spend more than double what it spent in 2008, a presidential election year, with most of the money going to Republicans).
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_________________________________________________
harmful corporate action and assume further that any criminal penalties imposed on the company would impose a loss on them disproportionate to any gain from the wrongdoing. This type of “unfair” collateral damage is unfortunate. But it infects all of criminal
justice. When human offenders are sent away to prison, their families, complicit or not, are often left without a breadwinner and lose
whatever emotional and other intangible sustenance their loved
ones provide. In some cities, the criminal justice system deprives
whole communities of a large percentage of their young males, in
ways that can seriously damage the social structure.11 A rehabilitative approach would significantly mitigate these types of harms in
both the corporate and individual contexts, but if the system insists
on retributive punishment, harm to innocents is inevitable.
11
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At the same time, the collateral damage produced by criminal
prosecution, independent of the stigma already caused by the fact
that grave harm has occurred, has often been exaggerated in the
corporate context. Those who oppose criminal liability for corporations often trot out the case of Arthur Andersen as an illustrative
horror story. But even had there been no criminal charges Arthur
Andersen would have suffered immensely. What is left of the company today is targeted with hundreds of civil lawsuits.12 And the
firm that gave a passing grade to the financial shenanigans of Enron
– probably the most hated company in the United States – as well as
the books of WorldCom – which suffered the biggest bankruptcy in
history – would have been the bad boy of the accounting world regardless of whether it, or anyone in it, had ever been criminally
prosecuted.

W

PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

hile Citizens United reinforces the case in favor of corporate
criminal liability, it also provides a basis for enhancing the
procedural rights of corporations suspected of crime. The Court’s
First Amendment rationale could well foster more robust Fourth
Amendment protections for corporations. And the decision might
even support the case for a corporate privilege against selfincrimination, a right that, to date, courts have been unwilling to
grant.
To see how the analysis might work, consider in more detail the
Court’s reasoning in Citizens United. The majority stated, “Speech is
an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold
officials accountable to the people. The right of citizens to inquire,
to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a
precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means
to protect it.”13 Since corporations are citizens too, the Court went
on to hold, they too have a fundamental right to hold officials accountable and to speak and use information.
12

See Kathleen F. Brickey, Andersen’s Fall from Grace, 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 917,
950-51 (2003).
13
130 S.Ct. at 898.
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The privacy, property and autonomy interests protected by the
Fourth Amendment are also “essential” to democracy. As Monrad
Paulsen stated years ago, “All the other freedoms, freedom of
speech, of assembly, of religion, of political action, presuppose that
arbitrary and capricious police action has been restrained.”14 Further, as Neil Richards has demonstrated, the Fourth and First
Amendments are intimately connected. In his article Intellectual Privacy, Richards explains why government efforts to obtain certain
types of information or invade certain types of spaces infringe not
only the expectations of privacy normally associated with the
Fourth Amendment but also affect entitlements under the First
Amendment. He makes a strong case for the proposition that this
protection extends to any activities associated with freedom of
thought and freedom to explore ideas – including communications,
websites visited, books owned, and every term entered into a
search engine.15
If corporations are entitled to freedom of speech, and protection
from unregulated government intrusion is necessary to ensure that
speech is freely exercised, the Fourth Amendment’s application to
corporations may need to be revisited. Right now, corporations
have virtually no Fourth Amendment rights where it really counts.16
The Court has held that a subpoena for corporate records is valid
even if the government only seeks to satisfy “official curiosity,” so
long as “the inquiry is within the authority of the agency” and “the
demand is not too indefinite.”17 Yet subpoenas can be used to obtain
all sorts of information relevant to corporate speech, ranging from
phone and computer logs to email messages and accounting records. One might object that corporations cannot have “intellectual
14

Monrad G. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, in
Police Power and Individual Freedom 87, 97 (Claude R. Sowle ed., 1962).
15
Neil Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 Texas Law Review 387 (2008).
16
In some inspection situations, a warrant requirement exists, but individualized
suspicion is not required for these warrants and exceptions to the requirement
abound. See Charles Whitebread and Christopher Slobogin, Criminal Procedure:
An Analysis of Cases and Concepts 319-324 (5th ed.2008).
17
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privacy.” But Citizens United’s willingness to grant corporations the
right “to inquire, to hear, to speak and to use information” puts a
real crimp in that argument.
The same goes for the privilege against self-incrimination, which
up to now has not applied to corporations because of the Supreme
Court’s 1906 decision in Hale v. Henkel.18 Hale’s apparent rationale
for its conclusion – besides the obvious one that according corporations a right to remain silent could derail the regulatory state – was
that, even if a corporation had a Fifth Amendment right, it could
not be asserted by third parties (e.g., the corporate officers) nor by
the corporation itself, given its non-human status. But if corporations can possess and exercise a right to speak (per Citizens United),
they can possess and assert a right not to speak. It is true that, in
First Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the Court suggested that the Fifth
Amendment self-incrimination privilege is a “purely personal” right
and therefore is not meant to provide protection against coercion of
a corporate entity.19 But that statement ignored Hale’s reluctance to
decide definitively whether a corporation is a person for Fifth
Amendment purposes. It also is hard to reconcile with the fact that,
since Hale, the Court has extended to corporations the guarantees
of the Double Jeopardy Clause and the Due Process Clause, both of
which are also rights that the Fifth Amendment accords to “any person.”20
These contentions about the Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights
of corporations, if accepted, would require adjustments to fairly
well-entrenched precedent. But the extra political power corporations now have because of Citizens United could help the courts see
the light of day. If so, there could be other repercussions as well.21
18

201 U.S. 43 (1906).
435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1979).
20
201 U.S. at 70. See Mayer, supra note 3, at 618-19.
21
One particularly startling possibility: corporations could have a “race.” Long ago
some courts took this idea quite seriously. See, e.g., People’s Pleasure Park Co., Inc.
v. Rohleder, 109 Va. 439, 63 S.E. 981 (1909). Although these decisions found that
even all-black corporations are impersonal, colorless entities, they relied on assumptions rendered suspect by Citizens United, which might require extension of
19
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S

BENEFITS FOR HUMANS?

ince this piece is already full of conjectures, it won’t hurt to add
a few more. Consider first a story from another domain. Federal
Rule of Evidence 410 prohibits the trial use of statements made
during the plea bargaining process unless the defendant somehow
forfeits or waives the rule’s protection. This rule benefits white
collar and street criminals alike. But it exists solely because of the
corporate bar. The history of Rule 410’s genesis makes clear that,
without the political clout of the latter group, the rule’s proponents
would never had prevailed over a very hostile Department of Justice.22
It would be nice to think that the same dynamic could occur if
corporations began flexing their post-Citizens United muscle in the
criminal justice system. If so, perhaps pro-defendant changes in
strict liability doctrine brought on by litigation in the corporate
context would lead to elimination of the Pinkerton and felony murder rules that permit conviction of humans for accidental and nonnegligent crime.23 If corporations are able to convince the courts
that recovery rather than ostracism is the best way of reducing recidivism, perhaps sentences for human criminals would become
more focused on rehabilitation than retribution. Maybe government
efforts to access personal information about human suspects from
banks, phone companies and other third party institutions (an investigatory practice that is currently unrestricted by the Constitution24)
would require more justification if corporate records are accorded
greater protection under the Fourth Amendment. And perhaps recognition of a corporate Fifth Amendment would not only rejuveanti-discrimination laws to raced or gendered corporations.
See Christopher Slobogin, The Story of Rule 410 and United States v. Mezzanatto: Using Plea Statements at Trial, in Evidence Stories 103, 105-08 (2006).
23
For a description of the strict liability regimes established by Pinkerton v. United
States, 328 U.S. 640 (1948) and the felony murder rule, see LaFave, supra note
7, at 722-723 & 790-796.
24
See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 735 (1976), and Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735 (1979).
22
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nate legal resistance to the rat-out-your-employees deals that have,
in recent times, routinely been forced on corporate officers,25 but
also percolate down to the back rooms of stationhouses and reduce
the coercive pre-plea bargaining that goes on between police and
human street criminals.
But probably not.

25

See Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 Va. L. Rev. 853
(2007).
86

14 GREEN BAG 2D

